THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, 1960–1965

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PERU HAS A DURABLE TRADITION OF PEASANT REBELLION, MOST RECENTLY DEscribed by José Matos Mar (1967) and Oscar Cornblit (1970), which dates far back to the eighteenth century movements led by Juan Santos Atahuallpa and José Gabriel Túpac Amaru. Twentieth century guerrilla leaders have tried to identify with this tradition by echoing their predecessors' concern for the Indians' right to work their own land and to be free from exploitation. They have named their fronts for Túpac Amaru, Pumacahua, Pachacutec, and other native revolutionaries of an earlier era, and they have proposed fundamental changes in Peruvian society, notably agrarian reform, in a conscious effort to complete a struggle that has gone on for more than two centuries to secure land and dignity for campesinos.

To date, however, the guerrillas' efforts to convince the Peruvian campesino that they share his aspirations to own the land have failed for a variety of reasons. The suggestion of the late Sebastián Salazar Bondy (1962) that the Andes might become another Sierra Maestra today seems hardly justified. In May 1963, Hugo Blanco, a peasant leader who had led a series of highly successful land invasions near Cuzco after 1960, was jailed by the Peruvian government. After less than four months of activity, guerrilla bands operating in the highlands outside of Cuzco and Ayacucho were defeated in 1965 by the efficient Peruvian military. The deaths in 1967 of the surviving Peruvian guerrilla leaders with Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia robbed the Peruvian movement of both symbolic and actual leadership, and opened to question whether the guerrilla tactics successfully employed by Fidel Castro in Cuba were applicable to the rest of Latin America.

In Peru, where as late as 1963, .1 per cent of the population controlled over 60 per cent of the land under cultivation, the profound desire of the rural peasantry to own the land which they work appeared to be the most certain means of securing mass support for any revolutionary endeavor. The most successful exposition of this thesis was made by Blanco, a Trotskyite labor organizer from Cuzco, who mobilized an estimated 300,000 peasants in the Lares and La Convención valleys, located ninety miles north of Cuzco, during the period 1959–1963, in land invasions which overran nearly three hundred haciendas. Because most of these lands were unoccupied, guerrilla warfare played a negligible role in these invasions. Nor did the movement spread throughout Peru because of the isolated nature of the region and the rapid recognition by the government of the peasants' de facto ownership of the lands which they had seized. Nevertheless, the early successes of Blanco had a galvanizing effect upon the Peruvian new left as well as on intellectuals worldwide. By 1965, two separate guerrilla organizations, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)

and the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN) had entered the mountains in an attempt to capitalize upon Blanco's successes and to create there a Castro-type revolution.

Although there well may be additional explanations, four reasons help to explain the rapid defeat of the Peruvian guerrillas in 1965. First, a severe ideological crisis split the Peruvian left during the period following World War II, a crisis exacerbated by the successes of Castro and the Sino-Soviet rupture. This split prevented the guerrillas in Peru from securing critical support from the left, especially from the progressive bourgeoisie in the cities on whom they had counted heavily. Secondly, the guerrillas were hampered by a lack of adequate planning, which resulted in their failure to secure the support of the peasantry. Rushing into action hurriedly after the capture of Blanco and the accession of the reformist government of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1964, the guerrillas remained separated from the peasantry by an immense cultural and linguistic barrier which they never were able to surmount. The mutual mistrust thus engendered between the two groups prevented effective cooperation and hindered military activity. Third, the Peruvian guerrillas displayed confusion about the exact nature of the society which they were attacking, as well as misunderstanding of the Cuban and Chinese models for guerrilla warfare which they professed to follow. Finally, political events conspired to isolate the guerrillas. The intervention of an institutional military junta in the summer of 1962 had acted to prevent a return of the old order and permitted the election of Belaúnde the following year. The belief of many Peruvians that Belaúnde's politics represented an emerging new order was reinforced by the passage of a moderate agrarian reform bill which may have considerably eased peasant discontent and thereby prevented the subjective conditions favorable to a guerrilla war from materializing between 1963 and 1965. The Peruvian military effectively capitalized on these conditions to quickly defeat the guerrilla bands that year. In 1968 the army acted decisively to prevent their reappearance by overthrowing Belaúnde, whose government by that date had failed to produce the new order to which it was pledged. In 1970 the passage of a major agrarian reform bill which expropriated large coastal sugar properties as well as lands in the sierra seemed likely to reduce further the chances for the successful resumption of guerrilla warfare in rural Peru.

The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the best writing about the Peruvian guerrillas done in the last decade and to point out what seem to be significant historiographical developments within certain related areas. Because of the proliferation of published materials on a subject of this nature, articles with such a focus are necessarily somewhat dated upon publication. No claim of completeness is made.

On the subject of Latin American guerrillas in general, or those in Peru in particular, there has been no lack of scholarly attention. Writings vary widely in both scholarship and orientation, however, because of the difficulty of assembling materials on such an elusive subject. One interested in the Peruvian new left might profitably begin by consulting Ronald H. Chilcote's (1970) comprehensive bibliography on

the Latin American left during the present century, which contains eight hundred entries on Peru alone. The collection also offers a brief précis on leftist activities in each area and a listing of pertinent journals to help the interested researcher. In addition, Vera B. Lamberg's (1970) bibliography of Castroite guerrillas in Latin America during the last decade is useful as a continental survey of the subject, although it neglects several important works.

Among the standard secondary accounts of Latin American guerrilla movements during the present century, those published by Luis Mercier Vega (1969), the Paris-based editor of *Aportes*, and by political scientist James Petras (1968) depend heavily upon published sources of varying reliability. The best treatment of the subject by far is Richard Gott's *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (1971), a detailed account of the movement which employs a wide variety of published sources in a scholarly and readable fashion. An additional strength of Gott's work lies in its refusal to moralize upon the subject. The author resists indicting the guerrillas for failing to bring about the revolution, noting that their immediate objective, which he feels was achieved, was simply to create the conditions out of which a revolution might occur later. Gott also suggests that the international repercussions of the Latin American guerrillas have been more important than supposed, and have influenced revolutionary developments elsewhere throughout the world.

To understand the land invasions and guerrilla war which took place in Peru between 1960 and 1965, one must first take into account the agrarian situation which helped to provoke the confrontations. Sociologist Héctor Martínez's *Bibliografía indígena andina peruana, 1900–1968* (1968), a two-volume bibliographical listing of the major works in Spanish on the subject, offers a logical starting point for the investigator searching for the roots of these agrarian problems. Older monographic studies on the Peruvian agrarian situation by sociologist Thomas Ford (1955) and Mexican agricultural economist Edmundo Flores (1950), have been recently augmented by studies of the Peruvian hacienda made by Mario C. Vásquez (1961), Julio Cotler (1970), Matos Mar (1970), and Martínez (1970) himself, all of which help to explain the evolution and development of the great estate and its labor system as a primary obstacle to agricultural progress.

Perhaps the best-balanced assessment to date of the land reform issue in Peru and its relationship to the social and economic development of the country has been issued by the Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA) in 1966, a team of OAS experts who addressed themselves to the principal technical, financial, institutional, and other obstacles to a successful program of land reform. Assembled in the wake of the guerrilla uprisings of 1965, the report is an unflattering and objective analysis of both Peruvian efforts and failures to reform the agrarian system, compiled by a variety of commentators of all political persuasions. The CIDA findings have been admirably reported upon by Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (1971), whose work summarizes the agrarian reform issue in Latin America and the United States' response to it in recent years. Luis Dongo Denegri's (1971) two-volume survey of the agrarian measures taken by the Peruvian military since 1968

outlines the responses made to several of the CIDA proposals. The more polemical treatments of the land reform issue in Peru by leftist authors Ricardo Letts Colmenares (1964) and Carlos Malpica (1963; 1968) are useful for an understanding of the mainspring of guerrilla discontent, although they are designed more to incite than to inform. Both explain the need for summary, uncompensated expropriation of these landholds but fail to go beyond this position to the more fundamental questions of way and means, as well as economic consequences.

As Leon Trotsky once observed, the fundamental premise of a revolution must be that the existing social situation in a country should have become obsolete in terms of its ability to resolve the urgent problems of development. To date, there has been little in the way of consensus regarding the exact nature of Peruvian society or of the abilities of that society to meet national needs and aspirations. Moreover, changing conditions since 1968 have served only to further confuse the issue. The Marxist interpretation of Peruvian reality is lucidly explained by Ricardo Martínez de la Torre (1948). Sociologist François Bourricaud (1967) has long asserted that an oligarchy of powerful private citizens ruled in Peru, using the political structure largely to serve their own interests. In the recent past, Bourricaud has credited urbanization and industrialization with a "cholification" of Peruvian society and a breakup of the old patron-client relationships, both of which have helped to erode this oligarchical domination. Studies by sociologist James L. Payne (1965), and political scientists Richard H. Stephens (1971) and Carlos Alberto Astiz (1969) have refined Bourricaud's thesis. Payne's study of labor and politics in Peru has attempted to explain the Peruvian political system without resorting to an oligarchical construct, which he finds simplistic. Instead, he views political power in Peru as being widely held and focused in the president, who presides over a system in which violence is both highly structured and quite predictable. Astiz has extended the analysis still further by identifying both the composition and political behavior of the major pressure groups and power elites within the Peruvian system.

The objective nature of Peruvian society or politics is perhaps of less importance to this paper than the knowledge that the guerrilla leadership accepted Peru as being feudal and predicated their theories regarding the correct conduct of a guerrilla war on this assumption. This belief, which has been best expressed by MIR leader Luis de la Puente (1965), helps to explain the lack of support and even opposition which the guerrillas encountered among the traditional Peruvian left, which argued that Peru had to first enter a mature capitalist phase before the subjective conditions favoring revolution would become present. The confusion, dissension, and eventual defeat which ensued in 1965 did little to reconcile the argument. Survivors of the guerrilla struggle insist upon the abandonment of this obsolete version of Peruvian society and seek a clarification of its true nature in order that future movements may act in accord with them, while members of the traditional left feel vindicated in their judgment of Peruvian reality.

Not since the yeasty days of the *indigenista* movement in Peru during the 1920's, which produced leaders such as José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya de la

Torre, has a charismatic man of the masses risen in Peru to equal Hugo Blanco. A native of Cuzco and a graduate of the University of La Plata in Argentina, where he studied under the Trotskyite Hugo Bressano, Blanco returned to Cuzco in 1958, where he became active in the peasant unions, which were affiliated with the Federación Nacional de Campesinos Peruanos (FENECAP). A natural leader and fluent in Quechua, Blanco was also a member of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolutionario (POR). This party became international in 1961 with the creation by Bressano of the Frente Izquierda Revolucionaria (FIR), a broad union of leftist organizations in solidarity with peasant federations in Brazil and Guatemala, which advocated land seizures and preached a Communist ideology to the peasantry.

Further research into the exact international orientation of Blanco and his movement seems warranted. Writing under the pseudonym of Nahuel Moreno (1962), Bressano has described the creation in Peru of the FIR and of the divisions which arose between the leadership in Lima and its field commanders in the Cuzco region. Gonzalo Añi Castillo (1967), whose account of the FIR and its activities is the most detailed and complete, explains, among other events, the series of bank robberies conducted in Lima by the FIR to secure funds for the Blanco movement. The fact that the robberies failed, combined with the internal divisions between Blanco and the FIR leadership, may have combined to reorient the former from an organizer to an activist, perhaps hastening his defeat as well as that of his movement.

There are several accounts of Blanco and his movement, ranging from Salazar Bondy's (1965) short treatment of its leadership, to journalistic accounts by J. Guillermo Guevara (1959) and Hugo Neira (1964; 1968), all of which fail to go much beyond chronological summation to the more complex social implications of the movement itself. In addition, there are accounts in the Trotskyite organs *Obrero y Campesino* (1960) and *Voz Obrero* (1960), containing some interesting views by the party faithful. Finally, Blanco (1964) has left a short account of his goals and activities as of his jailing in 1963. The single-volume treatment of Blanco by Villanueva (1967), however, remains the standard of inquiry on this fascinating individual, while Mario Malpica's (1967) overview of the guerrilla years appends several of Blanco's more important statements of policy. The *International Socialist Review* (1965) has reprinted several of Blanco's letters to various associates, which help to explain his program and aspirations.

No doubt because of Blanco's successes, several important studies of peasant organizations in Peru have been undertaken in recent years. These range from a rather superficial Trotskyite account by Adolfo Gilly (1963) to the more mature writings of sociologist Aníbal Quijano (1965: 1967; 1968) who has considered the position of the peasantry within the entire scheme of Peruvian society and has concluded that mobilization of the peasant is a prerequisite for economic and social development. Other perceptive commentators on the subject of Peruvian class structure and the peasants' role within it have been political sociologists Cotler (1967), and Felipe Portocarrero (1969) of the Andean Seminar Series of the Instituto de

Estudios Americanos in Lima. These authors, and also Quijano and Bourricaud (1967), view the bourgeoisie in Peru, which remains dependent upon and reflective of the upper classes, as the chief problem which permits internal colonialism and oligarchical domination to persist.

Studies touching upon the Latin American peasant and his mentality, such as that edited by Henry A. Landsberger (1969), examined cholo leadership and the peasant as revolutionary. Although most authors seem to accept the peasant as a potentially explosive force, they seem to agree that he must be guided and led by dissatisfied cholos such as Blanco, who possesses the requisite revolutionary skills and political acumen to combat effectively the existing sociopolitical system. The defeat of Blanco is accordingly explained more in terms of union rivalries and other external political factors than by any questioning of the revolutionary orientation of the peasantry itself.

Both sociologist Wesley W. Craig, Jr. (1966; 1967) and English historian Eric J. Hobsbawm (1969) have studied the complex dynamics of the La Convención uprisings and seemingly conclude that it was an atypical situation. Because of a scarcity of labor in the region, landowners granted land to the workers and encouraged them to raise coffee, from which they derived considerable income. Hobsbawm has noted that these unusual preconditions produced a situation in which the peasants were more desirous of securing economic benefits than anything else, and were willing to live within a neo-feudal environment to secure such gains. The extraordinary prosperity of the peasants during the early 1950's threatened the traditional master-peasant social relationships and forced the landowners to withdraw many rights in an effort to reimpose the old social system. The result: a rapid spread of peasant leagues which provided Blanco with a ready vehicle for mobilization.

Hobsbawm warns of the atypicality of La Convención and of the dangers in isolating economic analysis from its social and historical context and suggests that the time has come to test the La Convención experience in other regions. As a beginning, one might profitably apply Landsberger's (1969) fifteen hypotheses regarding peasant movements to La Convención and other regions in Peru. Finally, as Cotler and Portocarrerro (1969) demonstrate, there seem to be substantial variations in the orientation of peasant organizations throughout Peru, especially between those on the coast and in the sierra, as well as differences in the responses made toward them by landowners, government officials, and even international forces—sufficient variations to hinder facile generalizations about the peasants' organizational and revolutionary capacities. Moreover, in light of Blanco's failures, may not future mass leadership come from the masses themselves, as political sociologists Magali Sarfatti and Arlene Bergman (1969) imply?

To understand the two-year lapse following the defeat of Blanco in 1963 and the appearance in 1965 of guerrilla bands in the Peruvian highlands, one must be aware of the deep division that occurred within the Peruvian left after World War II, and which continued after the Cuban Revolution. During these years a crisis of legitimacy occurred within Peru's bourgeois reform parties, notably the Alianza

Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), founded in Mexico in 1924 by Haya de la Torre. Good evidence exists that Blanco's charismatic appeal and early successes in mobilizing the peasantry contributed to this growing rift within the Peruvian left. Although Blanco's movement failed to spread, it served to convince younger leftists that the traditional APRA and the Partido Comunista Peruana (PCP) were inadequate vehicles to serve as the revolutionary vanguard called for earlier by "Che" Guevara (1963) and by the French Marxist Régis Debray (1967), both of whom strongly advocated a "countryside model" for guerrilla warfare as a revolutionary alternative.

A vast body of literature exists, much of it polemical in both tone and approach, on the subjects of the political and ideological bases of Aprismo. Early commentators such as Harry Kantor (1953) viewed the movement as largely a nationalistic and personalistic extension of Haya himself, while others, including Alfredo Hernández Urbina (1956), Hernando Aguirre Gamo (1962) and historian Fredrick B. Pike (1964), have stressed the more negative aspects of its development, including a subversive, neo-Marxist orientation. In addition, Bourricaud (1966) has dealt with APRA's pragmatic reform ideology in a changing world.

There are encouraging signs, however, that some of the more polemical work on APRA is being replaced by serious and detached historical analyses of the movement. In 1957, Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez surveyed the political literature of Peru from González Prada and Mariátegui to Haya de la Torre in an effort to establish continuities between the indigenistas and Apristas. More recently, Peter Klarén (1970) has completed a study of the origins of Aprismo in the Department of La Libertad, in which he carefully charts the development of a modern economic structure produced by competition among local and foreign sugar elites during the early part of the twentieth century. These changes, he contends, produced an economic and political situation beneficial to the fledgling APRA party, and were far more pivotal in determining its growth than the depression of 1929, which is frequently credited with widening Aprismo's popularity. Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (1971) has surveyed the Aprista's fundamentally moderate stance on the subject of indigenismo, and alludes to the defections in the 1960's of many youthful party members, several of whom later became guerrillas. It would be interesting to know how the Aprista dissidents and guerrillas attempted to identify with these early proponents of the indigenista ideology and to what extent the official party position on the Indian influenced their defection.

Much of the pessimism with which the guerrillas regarded APRA stemmed from the ideological shifts of Haya de la Torre prior to to the period 1948–1956, when the party was proscribed from participating in Peruvian politics and Haya remained a virtual captive in the Colombian embassy building in Lima. During this period, APRA divided into two groups, fundamentally opposed to each other, one concerned with the basic transformation of Peru along lines suggested earlier by Haya; the other, which now included Haya himself, obsessed with the idea of obtaining the presidency regardless of the political accommodations that might be necessary

to attain that goal. By 1956, the split was essentially complete, when Haya entered into an unholy *conviviencia* with ex-dictator Manuel de Odría, the candidate of the right. Although the presidential elections of 1962 were overturned by the army that summer in protest against such an arrangement, the split remains to weaken Aprista politics.

Although the fact of the Aprista rupture is well established, we know little about the way in which APRA functioned during its underground period, 1948–1956, or the facts which might help us understand why dissidents were driven out and ultimately organized into parties advocating guerrilla warfare. For example, Grant Hiliker (1971), a career foreign service officer who has recently made a study of the APRA and its limitations as a mass party, suggests that many of Haya's policies were resisted at lower party levels, indicating considerable friction within the organization itself. Villanueva's (1956) classic account of the APRA split indicts the Aprista high command for its failure to support reformist elements within the party. Included in his study is a letter to Haya from his second-in-command, Manuel Seoane, which frankly discusses the Aprista split, and refers to an attempted accommodation between Haya and Juan Perón in Argentina during this period. Such disclosures indicate that many key features of APRA's evolution remain unknown to researchers. Insofar as the split ultimately helped produce a vacuum in the left and a guerrilla movement, it is an important subject, deserving further research.

One of the more significant defectors from the APRA in the wake of the Cuban Revolution was De la Puente, who later became the founder of the MIR and its foremost guerrilla leader. De la Puente was a native of Trujillo and a relative of Haya's who had been exiled from Peru by Odría in 1948 for his part in the abortive attack by APRA reform elements on the Callao garrison. De la Puente's early years and his exile in Mexico are described in some detail by Malpica (1967), although exactly what contacts he had with Castroite or Bolivian groups then training there are unknown. Presumably the Bolivian Revolution made a great impact on De la Puente, who was jailed by Odría in 1954 for attempting to foment a similar revolution in Peru. Following his release from jail, De la Puente returned to Trujillo and took a law degree. His doctoral thesis on the subject of agrarian reform was later published as *La reforma del agro peruano* (1966). Basic to his ideas was the acceptance of Peru as a semi-feudal area where effective land reform was indispensible. There was no indication at this date, however, that he considered mass mobilization of the peasantry or guerrilla warfare as an acceptable means of securing such reforms.

It would seem that the Cuban successes played an important role in catalyzing De la Puente's discontent with traditional Aprista politics. In 1960, four months after the Cuban revolution's triumph, he represented the Peruvian left at the First National Agrarian Reform Forum in Havana, arguing there strongly in favor of summary expropriation and socialism. Although he purported to represent APRA, by the following year, De la Puente had led a group of dissidents out of the party and had formed Apra Rebelde. Central to the new party's views was an extensive program of agrarian reform, set out in the MIR's Manifesto of Chiclayo (1963a), which

was referred to as a second Declaration of Havana. Initially, Apra Rebelde sought to proceed through legal channels to secure agrarian reforms, with Malpica, the party's national deputy in congress, presenting the Manifesto to that body for consideration. But considerable harrassment, including an unrelated jail sentence, led De la Puente in June 1962, to drop the Aprista affiliation and to create the MIR, in line with actions taken earlier by the dissidents from Venezuela's Acción Democrática Party (AD). This date marks the severance of MIR from traditional party politics and its swing toward guerrilla activity as the primary means to achieve its goals.

Presumably the MIR was spurred into action by events which took place in Peru barely a month after its founding. On July 18, 1962, a reformist military coup cheated Haya and the APRA once again from securing the presidency by overturning the elections of that year which Haya had apparently won. The transfer of power to Belaúnde by elections a year later began a period of moderate capitalist reformism and renewed recognition of peasant problems. Several pilot land reform projects were passed to ease the peasant discontent agitated by Blanco, who was captured and jailed in May 1963. Although the new left had been aware of the opportunities presented by Blanco's uprisings, the lack of internal unity within the left had precluded any effective action, although the peasant activism did accelerate mobilization procedures within the leftist groups.

In October 1962, De la Puente travelled to Quillabamba to meet with Blanco in a conference that contains as many unresolved questions as that held more than a century earlier between Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín. Although it is not clear what sort of aid the fledgling MIR, whose membership was far from united on the subject of guerrilla warfare, might have offered Blanco, no accommodation was reached between the two groups. Whether it was the clash between Marxist and Trotskyite ideologies, Blanco's distrust of guerrilla cadres outside of his control, or perhaps Blanco's pragmatic assessment that the MIR lacked the capacity to aid his movement, remains unclear at this time. Neither man seems to have been a completely free agent in the negotiations, although it would be instructive to know if Blanco was dissuaded from accepting MIR assistance by the FIR leadership in Lima which had thus far failed to assist him adequately and with whom he had many fundamental differences.

In Lima's Plaza San Martín on February 7, 1964, De la Puente (1966) delivered a fiery speech which defined the reorientation of the MIR from an urban, middle class party to one largely modelled on the Cuban example, its support to be derived from an awakened peasantry and elements of the progressive, urban bourgeoisie. The body of the speech, which was the collaborative work of several MIR ideologues, argued that the electoral process so revered by APRA had failed to make the basic changes in the agrarian structure of Peru set out in the Manifesto of Chiclayo, and that only "a new form of struggle" was capable of effecting these changes. Not only did the correct subjective conditions for the conduct of a guerrilla war exist in Peru, De la Puente argued: they were perhaps superior to those that had existed earlier in Cuba.

Clearly, by this proclamation the MIR hoped to inherit the fervor and loyalty which had been given to Blanco earlier. But it is unclear what positive steps were taken to secure such support, although MIR began to set up its own guerrilla units to replace the union militia on which Blanco had depended. De la Puente argued that the guerrillas were fully capable of retaining both political and military control of the movement as the Cubans had done, without the necessity of reserving this for Leninist-type urban parties. Out of this he believed would emerge Guevara's "party in embryo" which would ultimately spread and unify the entire Peruvian left. For a variety of reasons, both ideological and tactical, none of this was to occur.

In July 1964, the MIR established a series of fronts in the Departments of Cuzco and Junín, while another was planned for Piura, to the north. De la Puente set up his base on the remote Mesa Pelada, a high plateau overlooking the Urubamba River north of the ancient Inca citadel of Machu Picchu. Not long thereafter, the MIR issued a "Revolutionary Proclamation" directed both at the Belaúnde government and the Peruvian left, whose support they were trying to enlist. Mercado (1967), the movement's chief biographer, has noted that this tactic flatly contradicted the Cuban emphasis upon secrecy and allowed the military to begin counterinsurgency operations.

Next, the MIR settled into a series of immobile security zones rather than employing the mobile, flexible focos advocated by Guevara as staging bases for surprise attacks. Later the Peruvian Army was easily able to penetrate these zones, which became death traps. As Américo Pumaruna (1966), a pseudonym used by Ricardo Letts Colmenares, a Peruvian activist author, asserts, there is some uncertainty as to whether De la Puente misunderstood the Cuban guerrilla model from the beginning, or, as ELN chieftan Héctor Béjar (1969; 1970) believes, he tried to adopt it to fit Peruvian conditions. Colombian guerrillas had somewhat earlier been successful in employing static bases, although by 1965 the Cuban foco had largely supplanted this model. Whatever the case, it amounted to a serious mistake which helped to bring about the guerrillas' demise more rapidly than otherwise might have occurred.

Perhaps the most serious flaw in the preparations made by the MIR members was their inability to overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers which separated them from the peasantry. Control over the countryside, which Guevara, following Mao, had analogized to the sea in which the guerrilla swam as a fish, was never established by either MIR or ELN. Robbed of such peasant support, the guerrillas fell prey to well-equipped counterinsurgency forces. Although Mao had warned that one did not issue invitations to participate in a revolution as one might send invitations to a tea, the lesson had apparently been lost on the MIR guerrillas. Norman Gall (1967) notes that the MIR attempted to accomplish in four months what the Vietnamese had taken over two years to achieve among the mountain tribesmen of their country following World War II, namely, to win loyalty and support. Possibly, social and economic conditions in Peru forced a course of action upon the MIR which varied from the optimal situation which might have allowed them to emulate more closely the Cuban example. Whatever the case, in 1968, Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy

challenged Debray to defend his thesis by explaining the defeat of the MIR, which, to this writer's knowledge, has never been done. If, as Pumaruna has asserted, "the sign of Fidelismo presided over the Peruvian guerrilla struggle from the outset," it would be instructive to know the exact relationship between the two movements.

The question remains: why did Castro fail to aid Blanco, whose control over the peasantry was well-established, while assisting the MIR, which lacked this support, considered critical by the Cuban theorists. Gott (1967) believes that Castro's reluctance to aid Blanco stemmed less from the latter's Trotskyite orientation than from the fact that Castro lacked any personal knowledge of and contact with Blanco, such as he enjoyed with De la Puente. On the other hand, Silvestre Conduruna (1966), a pseudonymous representative of Vanguardia Revolucionaria (VR), another Peruvian leftist organization, claims that ideological considerations were controlling in the relationship between the two men, because Blanco's position on guerrilla warfare repudiated many aspects of the Cuban struggle which Castro was attempting to export throughout Latin America. Considering the fact that Cuba was gravitating further into the Soviet orbit after 1961, while the MIR had much admiration for the Chinese, whom they considered as Third World allies, it would be interesting to know more of the nature and extent of the assistance given to the MIR by Cuba, and whether such aid was granted with the advice and consent of the Soviet Union. Moreover, one might consider the Cuban position in this regard since 1967, when the Organización Latino-Americana de la Solidaridad (OLAS) Conference was held in Havana in an effort to coordinate Latin American guerrilla activities on a continental basis.

Because newsmen were barred by the army from the battlefields in 1965, the accounts which we possess of the fighting that took place between the guerrillas and the military in Peru are generally based upon secondhand information and thus vary widely in accuracy. Among the better accounts are those by correspondent Neira (1965), who covered Blanco's land seizures, and Mercado's (1967) biography of the revolutionary decade, 1955–1965. In addition, Marcel Niedergang (1965), Henry Raymont (1965), Gall (1967), Gilly (1965), and Francisco Monclova (1966), have briefly reported on the war from the field. Although it represents the official version of the events of 1965, the account by the Peruvian Ministerio de Guerra (1966), a detailed geographical description of the battle zones, containing personnel lists and captured photographs of the revolutionaries, remains the best single account of the struggle. If it has a flaw, it lies in the military's refusal to state the true number of casualties suffered, or to offer information on tactics, which reportedly included the use of napalm and United States advisors, and inadvertently, resulted in the killing of many peasants. Besides, the report attributes to the guerrillas a higher degree of operational efficiency than actually existed. Although we have no clear understanding of the role played by the United States in the struggle, Chaplin's (1968) article explains the postponement of the Peruvian revolution in military terms, namely by the use of helicopters, napalm, infra-red photography, and

other technological innovations developed between 1959 and 1965, which gave Belaúnde advantages in the field of counterinsurgency that Batista never possessed.

In 1962, the ELN broke away from the Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP) in much the same way and for some of the same reasons that the MIR had defected from the APRA. To date, far fewer studies of Peruvian Communism exist than might be, other than a Trotskyite account by Ismael Frías in the official organ *Obrero y Campesino* (1963), and an official version issued by the Comité Ejecutivo Nacional de la Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN), another breakaway group. Ernst Halperin (1967), a longtime Sinologist, has attempted to explain Peking's role in Latin American Communism, a subject which has also been recently explored by Cecil Johnson (1969). The weakness common to these treatments is their failure to focus upon Latin America, including Peru, or to offer specifics on the causes of the internal rifts in the Latin American left parties, which vary greatly. Most of our current information derives from Sino-Cuban relations, about which we know something. Can the same be said for Sino-Peruvian affairs?

The fact that the guerrillas conceived of their organizations as parties in embryo, and rejected political and military control by the PCP, would seem to explain the latter's intransigence toward the former, regardless of other considerations. Moreover, guerrilla activities invariably seem to have led to repression of PCP activities in the cities. The article by Peruvian Communist César Levano (1966), written in the wake of the MIR defeat, presents the reasons for PCP rejection of such activities. Yet, notwithstanding the above, the internal cleavages within the PCP and the serious difficulties it was having in attracting younger members suggest that some agreement might have been reached between the two groups had certain factors been present. Exactly what these preconditions might have been and why they could not be realized might be of great interest to students of traditional leftist political organizations who seek to know more about leftist party relationships with guerrilla groups. It would also be interesting to learn whether the PCP position was reached after consultation with the Russians or Chinese and what the positions of those powers might have been on the Peruvian situation. In a perceptive article on Cuban Communism, Daniel Tretiak (1970) makes the point that the Chinese Communists, like their Russian counterparts, generally withheld support for guerrillas unless they were unusually well-organized and willing to adhere to both the teaching and tactics of Mao, who presumably was never considered as a model by the Peruvians. He suggests also that Cuban support for guerrilla ventures materially declined after 1967, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the appearance of nationalist regimes such as the Peruvian military government which took power in 1968, with which Fidel seeks better diplomatic relationships. Cuban aid to Peru in the wake of the 1970 earthquake underlines this reorientation as do Castro's favorable pronouncements about the present Peruvian government.

In September 1965, the ELN moved into action in an area near La Mar, Ayacucho, midway between the two fronts then being manned by the MIR. It is a testimonial to the hasty and ill-planned character of the Peruvian guerrilla field operations

that their activities were completely uncoordinated, although the two groups were no more than a ten-day march apart from each other. By October, De la Puente had been killed in battle at Mesa Pelada. Béjar, the ELN chief, was captured in December, bringing the "Year of the Guerrilla" in Peru to a close.

Because of a remarkably frank account of the emergence and activities of the ELN by Béjar (1967; 1970), we are able to reconstruct the genesis of the Peruvian guerrilla movement much more clearly. Béjar alludes to, although he refrains from detailing, the fundamental splits with the Peruvian left after 1962, which he contends prevented any agreements from being reached between the two guerrilla organizations. Because both guerrilla groups were products of the intransigence which had long existed in Peru between the APRA and the PCP, differences between the guerrilla organizations were themselves difficult to surmount. Organizational distinctions between the two existed, with the MIR asserting that the revolution should be led by their party, which was well established, while the less organized ELN proposed to create the party out of the revolution. Neither group was willing to subordinate itself to the other's leadership. Thus when the MIR went into action on its own, the ELN was forced into activity ahead of schedule. Béjar indicts the MIR leadership for their intransigence and lack of cooperation which he claims largely determined the disastrous events taking place in 1965. Although undoubtedly these views reflect the biases and bitterness between the guerillas, Béjar's account remains the clearest and frankest report we possess of the party problems which contributed fully as much as the army to the guerrillas' demise in Peru.

Besides the internal configuration of the guerrilla experience, a number of nagging questions remain to be answered regarding the support which the guerrillas received from the progressive bourgeoisie in Peru, notably Catholic radicals, students, intellectuals, and the labor unions. RAND Corporation analyst Luigi Einaudi, R. L. Maullin, A. C. Stepan, and M. Fleet's 1969 survey of the changing Catholic Church, for example, notes the presence in Peru of several radical priests, such as Father Salomón Bolo Hidalgo, leader of the leftist FLN, and the Jesuit Father Romeo Luna-Victoria (1966), who has written a manual on revolutionary theory and practice, which the author-priest finds fully consistent with Catholic doctrine. It would be of interest to know what the relationship was between these men and the guerrillas, and to what degree the experiences of 1965 helped to turn the church toward supporting the military's land reform and other social welfare measures. The new support which the military has drawn from the Christian Democratic Party (CD) emphasizes the quandry in which these Catholic radicals in Peru find themselves today.

Questions also remain concerning the role played by students and intellectuals during the years under consideration. For example, in 1963, the gifted young Peruvian poet Javier Heraud was killed at Puerto Maldonado in Amazonian Peru while working for Blanco. As a young member of the Lima elite group, Heraud's participation raises the question of bourgeois involvement. It is notable that both the MIR and the ELN have claimed Heraud as a true revolutionary hero, with the latter nam-

ing a front in his honor. But was he representative of anything or anyone other than himself? Were other intellectuals involved? Did the Bolivian Communist Party betray him? The degree to which the guerrillas were able to inherit the fervor and loyalty which intellectuals in Peru and worldwide granted to Blanco, whom they regarded as a just opponent of tyranny and oppression, remains one of the unanswered questions of 1965.

The extent of Peruvian student collaboration with the guerrillas, if any existed, is almost completely unknown. It may be remembered that in Cuba, provincial university students aided Castro far more significantly than did their urban counterparts in Havana. Writing on Peru, Richard Patch (1960) and Einaudi (1968) have explained the growing popularity of Fidelismo in Peruvian universities after 1959, noting that anti-Communism has never been a dominant political myth in Latin America. Considering that some of these student bodies, such as that in Ayacucho, required a speaking ability in Quechua as a prerequisite for admission, their assistance might have counted greatly in enlisting peasant support. Was it ever solicited, and more importantly, received?

Finally, what was the exact orientation of the Peruvian labor unions during the period? Many of Blanco's supporters in the peasant federations were apparently ex-army veterans who had joined his cause out of frustration with the PCP. Did any of these persons join the guerrillas later on? While most of the unions remained under the control of the APRA or PCP, and therefore took a negative view of activities led by guerrilla insurgents, what were the positions of the MIR-dominated Federación Provincial de los Campesinos (FPC) or of the powerful fishery unions which fell under the control of the VR, a group more sympathetic to the guerrilla struggle? Given the regional and ideological diversities within Peruvian trade unionism, such questions might be pursued with fruitful results.

One of the more fascinating variables injected into the revolutionary situations in Peru during the past decade has been the seizure of power in 1968 by reformist military men whose orientation was perhaps heavily influenced by the guerrillas. Several times during the present century the army had intervened to prevent the APRA, which it thought to be irresponsibly leftist, from assuming power. During the period 1948–1968, as the APRA moved steadily to the right, the military in Peru grew increasingly reform-minded and impatient with civilian government. In 1968, the military again intervened to put a stop to the errors and excesses of the Belaúnde government, defects which, curiously enough, had been brought to light in part by military intelligence experts investigating the background of guerrilla activities.

There has been a growing body of writings on the subject of the present military government of Peru, headed by Division General José Velasco Alvarado. Historian L. N. McAlister (1970) and RAND analyst Einaudi (1969) have dealt with the subject from an essentially historical perspective to explain the advent of military reformism and political reorientation. Luis Váldez Pallette (1971) has sketched the history of Peruvian military education, notably that of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), which has played an influential role by indoctrinating the officer

corps about matters of social concern. This changing military mentality has been examined by Villanueva (1969), while sociologists Cotler (1969a; 1969b) and Bourricaud (1971) have tried to determine how such a reorientation might affect national development.

Most of the authorities agree that the Peruvian military government, which has proclaimed itself "nationalist and revolutionary," is governing institutionally, free of dominant and dominating personalities such as characterized past interventions, and that it has a sincere desire to free the nation from the evils of the past. But beyond the fact that the military leaders seem to subscribe to some form of capitalistic reformism rather than socialism, there is little agreement about where they stand. Einaudi (1970; 1971) and Einaudi and Stepan (1971) have produced unusually cogent analyses of recent Peruvian military developments, and they are convinced that it took the guerrilla campaigns of 1965–1966 "to force social theory out of the schools and into the barracks, thereby making political immobilism and economic decline of the late 1960s a matter of urgent military concern." This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the writings of Brigadier General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín (1967), the present Minister of Foreign Affairs and heir-apparent to the presidency, who has argued strongly that civic action and social reform are far more valuable tools than counterinsurgency for preventing future guerrilla wars. To what degree the orientation of key officers such as General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, the commander of the Peruvian Fourth Army, which put down the guerrillas and who is at this writing the Minister of Energy and Mining, was changed by the events of 1965 remains unclear but is no doubt highly significant.

There are indications that the Peruvian military developed a genuine compassion for the rural population as a result of having fought against the guerrillas, to the extent of giving their coup d'etat the code name "Plan Inca." The failure of the La Convención peasantry to support the guerrillas in the wake of a pilot land reform program in 1963 could not have helped but impress upon the military leaders the need for agrarian reform. With the passage of the sweeping agrarian reform bill in 1969, the military has clearly acted to replace the guerrillas as the peasants' best hope of securing both land and dignity. On the cover of the printed bill are pictures of Velasco and Túpac Amaru, the symbol of the 1968 revolution, proclaiming the slogan, "Countryman, the landowner will no longer eat the bread of your poverty." The reform bill has expropriated the large coastal sugar plantations, bastions of oligarchical domination. In addition, the military has passed stringent wage and price controls, dissolved Congress, and taken over several foreign-owned companies, including Standard Oil's subsidiary, the International Petroleum Company in Talara, long a target of nationalists of all political persuasions. The fact that these measures all were primary goals demanded by the MIR in 1964 demonstrates the weakened position in which the new left finds itself today in Peru. The freeing in 1971 of Blanco and the jailed guerrilla leaders indicates a new confidence on the part of the Peruvian military that its measures have taken effect. The release demonstrates the

conviction of the army that it can effectively control any future peasant movement that might occur, as well as the belief that none is likely to break out at the present time.

The Peruvian guerrilla movement of 1965 never progressed past the first or strategic defense stage defined by Guevara. Given the deep splits, outlined by Sergio Bruma (1965), persisting within the Peruvian left today, one might argue that the guerrilla movement mattered little and that further research on the subject is unnecessary. The present author contends rather that the scope of scholarly inquiry be broadened to place the Peruvian guerrilla within proper perspective in the Latin American revolutionary process. The balance of this article is devoted to specific suggestions as to how such research and analysis might be undertaken.

Much that has been written to date on the subject of the Peruvian guerrilla is incomplete, polemical in tone, and sometimes inaccurate because often based upon second-hand journalistic reporting. Other than Béjar's frank account of the ELN movement, few of the guerrillas have themselves written in any systematic fashion about the events of 1965, or, more importantly, about the circumstances which led up to those events. Some of what has been written has had a problem-solving orientation, such as the studies sponsored by the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), whose "Project Agile," carried out during 1964–1965, was designed to evaluate the capacities of both the guerrillas and the military to resist each other. Similar studies have been carried out by other organizations, both public and private. This approach has severe limitations also, not the least of which is the proposal of political and military solutions to what seem to this author to be fundamentally social and economic problems.

It seems highly desirable that any future studies of the guerrilla be placed within the historical and sociological context of the revolutionary process as it has developed in Latin America, a subject which has been touched upon summarily. Chilcote's (1970) bibliography has assembled a wide range of secondary materials dealing with the subject, materials that demand interpretation. Among those who have devoted attention to this process are Einaudi (1966), whose study of the changing contexts of revolution in Latin America traces the frustrations and divisions within Aprista-type parties which helped pave the way for the guerrillas. It is the author's contention that the "very enunciation" of the Cuban Revolution unfavorably altered conditions for guerrilla warfare throughout Latin American by changing "political conditions at national, regional and international levels," which have ultimately checked the development of further radical social revolutions of the Cuban type.

Certainly political conditions in Peru since 1968 bear out Einaudi's hypotheses. So many changes have taken place within the agrarian and political structures of the country since the military's assumption of power that studies undertaken prior to that date which seek to explain the realities of the situation run serious risk of obsolescence. Petras and LaPorte's (1971) survey of changing agrarian conditions in Peru and Chile pinpoint many of the innovations undertaken at the national level

which seem to have reduced revolutionary discontent and further discredit the guerrillas' contention that Peru is a dying, feudalistic, sociopolitical system.

In another provocative monograph, Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda (1968) has discussed changing revolutionary developments in that country since independence, with emphasis on the socialization process as a key factor explaining guerrilla activity. The author seems to suggest that the appearance of guerrilla bands might be considered not as a manifestation of social decay, but rather as an indication of the vitality of efforts being made by traditional societies to reform themselves; efforts which force a frustrated new left into self-defeating schemes. The analysis seems to be borne out in the case of Peru.

Such studies are important because they stress the varieties of the revolutionary process throughout Latin America and seek to explain this phenomenon. Although it is true that since the Cuban Revolution no guerrilla movement has been able to seize national power, several have never sought such ends. In Peru, although the movement failed, its psychological presence proved to be a constant worry and embarrassment to the weak Belaúnde administration, and perhaps hastened the military's assumption of the reins of government. It still remains to be demonstrated, given the proper leadership, goal structure, social base, and relationships with the traditional political parties, whether a guerrilla band in Peru or elsewhere in Latin America can duplicate the Cuban experience and seize control of the national government. To answer such a question, both Einaudi and Fals Borda suggest the need for a fuller understanding of the present realities of Latin American societies which seek to avert guerrilla wars. To borrow a phrase from Trotsky, who made reference to the difficulty of identifying the correct subjective conditions needed for a revolution, are both guerrillas and social scientists guilty of confusing the second month of pregnancy for the ninth?

Barrington Moore's (1966) challenging work on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy stands as an invitation to undertake further research on the Indian peasant in Peru. Although there are several excellent studies by anthropologists such as Henry F. Dobyns (1964) on peasant communities, as well as political analyses of these communities, such as the work of Edward Dew (1969), few psychologists have successfully plumbed the depths of the peasant mentality, nor have historians addressed themselves to the critical issue of the peasant as revolutionary. Progress along these lines, however, is not altogether lacking. F. LaMond Tullis (1970) has used a variety of sophisticated quantification techniques in his case study of the Mantaro Valley of central Peru. Analyzing the structural nature of the Mantaro Valley villages and the ties which have developed among these villages and their inhabitants, Tullis has attempted to explain the Mantaro peasants' failure to join the revolution during the period 1962–1966, and why some villages were more likely than others to develop a revolutionary orientation. Insofar as the work helps to explain the peasant as activist, it constitutes a valuable pioneering effort.

Future studies of the Peruvian Indian might do well to concentrate upon what sort of landholding he desires—private freehold or communal-collectivistic owner-

ship. Both the guerrillas and others have referred to the peasant's traditional bourgeois mentality as a deterrent to future revolutionary activity, yet the Indians' failure to respond to the incentives afforded by fee-simple forms of ownership and their fatalistic outlook towards life in general indicate a mentality which by definition hardly seems to fit the bourgeois pattern.

Given the presence of another charismatic leader like Blanco, it would be valuable to know if the Indian is bound by biases and other cultural obstacles which are so pronounced as to preclude any future revolutionary activity. While Béjar, in his account of the Ayacucho front, acknowledged the difficulties inherent in organizing peasant support, he denied that the ELN's failures were caused by a lack of revolutionary orientation among the peasantry, instead blaming the defeat upon the lack of organization among the guerrillas themselves. To date, the explanation of the Peruvian failure has been couched largely in terms of the difficult geographical conditions of the sierra or the technological expertise of the armed forces, neither of which, it may be observed, was a hindrance to Castro in Cuba. It is clearly time that we look more deeply into the Peruvian disaster, especially the peasants' role in it. For example, it would be most helpful to know why the Peruvian peasant to date has not responded to revolutionary activities as has his counterpart in the Caribbean. The question of whether the peasant is "revolutionizable" or even if his immediate world (Gemeinschaft) can be united to the larger world of national interests (Gesellschaft) has implications which exceed in importance the subject of guerrilla warfare alone.

Further inquiry into the guerrilla movement might begin with more detailed examination of its leadership as well as its cadre. Other than a few eulogies by trusted lieutenants, we have no good biographical studies of the Peruvian guerrillas. For example, other than a brief piece by Jorge Turner (1968) practically nothing is known of Juan Pablo Chang, or "El Chino," the most important ELN member to survive the 1965 massacre. Apparently Chang was a trusted confidant of Guevara, whose influence had at one time convinced Guevara to consider Peru as the site for his movement. Although Chang died with Guevara in Bolivia, we have no information about the series of decisions which resulted in the change to Bolivia as the site for the guerrilla war, nor of the guerrillas' plans to carry the struggle into Peru at a later date. Where was the Peruvian front to be located, and how was it to be organized? Perceptive monographic studies of the guerrilla leaders, such as Richard Maullin's (1968) treatment of the Colombian guerrilla chief Dumar Aljure, could do much to bring the Bolivian and Peruvian guerrilla experiences, which are parallel in so many ways, into closer focus.

Certainly we need to know much more than we presently do about the whole spectrum of leftist ideology in Peru from the time of Mariátegui onward, as well as of the present structure of the Peruvian left. As Béjar has noted, the guerrilla ideology and programs reflect a transition of the traditional left in Peru from old concepts toward new ones, with all the confusion which such a shift entails. For example, the MIR is apparently lukewarm in its support of Gonzalo Fernández Gasco, a guerrilla

leader holding out in the north in 1972. APRA Deputy Andrés Townsend (1965) has attempted to explain the dilemma that the appearance of the guerrillas posed for the traditional left, yet the defeat of the former in 1965 has not solved the problems posed these traditional groups, but has merely postponed them. Today, with the advent of military reformism in Peru, both the APRA and the PCP are confronted with the hard choice of supporting or opposing the military program, a quandry which threatens their very political survival. How might these parties respond to a well-organized and potentially effective mass movement, using guerrilla tactics, arising to challenge the hegemony of the military as a "revolutionary modernizer" in Peru? To date, only an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Ricardo V. Luna Mendoza (1962) and the recent study by Astíz (1969) serve as analytical tools for future studies of the Peruvian left, which is in a constantly changing state. More work is needed on the structure and leadership, as well as the self-perceptions of Peruvian leftists today.

Although it seems certain that the Peruvian military will remain a force for social control and modernization, whether in control of the government or not, there is little we can say with certainty about the internal mechanics of the present government or of its future orientation. Do President Velasco and his cabinet shape policy, or, as Bourricaud (1970), suggests, do they simply implement the recommendations of the twelve-man Comité de Oficiales Asesores del Presidente (COAP), a body of Marxist-oriented officers, educated at the CAEM, who recommend legislative measures and serve as a coordinating body to harmonize the various sectors of public administration? Will the Peruvian "revolution from above" continue along its present lines, seek to mobilize the masses on its behalf, or, as Einaudi (1971) suggests, may a conservative reaction be produced within the military as the result of bureaucratic inertia and resource scarcity? While the answers to such questions are uncertain, much depends upon who actually exercises power and the ways in which they conceptualize its use. Einaudi contends that the military intellectuals who today are guiding the internal revolution in Peru developed their ideas not simply from CAEM textbooks but out of a deep compassion for the sacrifices made by students, intellectuals, and guerrillas in 1965. Obviously, the institutional development of the military would be sorely tested by any forcible removal of this group from power.

Nowhere is the confusion regarding the exact orientation of the Peruvian military government more pronounced than in the statement of the leaders of the Peruvian new left, many of whom were former guerrillas. Upon his release from jail in December 1970, Blanco (1971) admitted that the initiation of capitalist reformism in Peru since 1968 had materially changed the political situation from what it had been earlier. Yet the government's refusal to permit him to resume his organizing activities has resulted in Blanco's exile to Mexico, where he sharply criticizes the Peruvian generals. Béjar (1970) also announced upon his release from prison that he had become convinced that change within the system could be achieved peacefully. Unlike his counterpart, Béjar today is a key officer of the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS), a government organization aimed at neutralizing the Aprista and Trotskyite leadership in the newly-formed sugar cooperatives and

gaining workers support for government throughout Peru. Other "leftist opportunists", as Blanco termed them, include Hugo Neira and Francisco Moncloa, and are also working for the military regime. More needs to be done to explain the cooperation of this group as contrasted with the continuing intrasigence of Blanco towards the military reformers.

Leftist opponents of the current military regime have been highly critical of its recent economic policies, namely the contracts signed in 1972 with the Southern Peru Copper Corporation for the extraction of copper at Cuajone, and with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, allowing them exploratory rights in the Peruvian Amazon, long thought to be an oil-rich region. Quijano (1971), the Peruvian new left's most cogent spokesman and himself an exile in Chile, argues that these new concessions represent a betrayal of the revolution and are in the long run likely to benefit the upper classes, producing ultimately a neo-imperialism which is likely to continue, rather than break, Peru's dependency relationship with the developed world. A short piece by Pumaruna (1971) echoes these sentiments. Both point up the need for thoughtful analyses of the political and economic trajectory of the current Peruvian military, which remains unique yet unexplained.

The field of Peruvian leftist ideology and organization in general, and of the guerrilla in particular, has been lightly spaded to date, and its tilling remains a hard chore. It is a field at once sensitive and subjective. There are scant systematized or objective data available on the subject, nor are there likely to be any for some time. The principals involved are reluctant to speak of their political activities except in private, and even then they condemn rather than clarify. Further, to study revolution and guerrillas is to analyze unfinished history. Although the guerrillas of 1965 were annihilated, their followers are presumably reorienting towards an urban posture on the model set out by the Tupamaros of Uruguay, about whom we know little. Their chief protagonists, the military, have hardly remained static during the intervening years. Peru has already unilaterally recognized Cuba in defiance of the sanctions of the Organization of American States (OAS) and has begun closer diplomatic relationships with the Marxist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. One can marvel at the fluidity of the situation under consideration here, although it constitutes a researcher's nightmare. Nevertheless, a start should be made, for the subjects of guerrillas, the societies which produce them, and the military which seek their defeat, are matters of importance and deep relevance. The exhortation of De la Puente to his men—"todos al campo"—should be directed to scholars as well as guerrilleros.

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